Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) have become a prominent feature of the international financial landscape. They are sufficiently diverse in their origins, structures, and objectives that generalizations are perilous. However, legitimate concerns have been raised in home and host countries about the management, behavior, and interactions of these funds. Many of those concerns can be addressed via increased accountability and transparency. The Santiago Principles are a good start in doing so, but my SWF scoreboard points to areas where these principles can be improved. Meanwhile, SWF compliance must be further increased. At the same time, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) effort to address concerns from the host-country side has not resulted in the erection of new barriers to that form of cross-border investment, but the OECD failed to reverse the creeping financial protectionism of the past decade. Because of their size and the source of their funding, some Asian funds are different. As a result, they will be held to a higher standard of accountability and transparency even as their government owners press for more openness to cross-border investment.
3
A particular SWF may have one or more of a number of objectives. One classification (IMF 2008) lists five: (1) stabilization funds designed to insulate the budget or the economy against price swings; (2) savings funds for future generations often transferring wealth that is underground into financial wealth aboveground; (3) reserve investment funds that are an adjunct to other arrangements for managing foreign exchange reserves and sometimes include a portion of the country's foreign exchange reserves; (4) development funds that are organized to achieve various socioeconomic objectives at home or abroad and may resemble financial holding companies; and (5) contingent pension reserve funds, as already discussed, that are intended to backstop government pension funds. In practice, most funds have a mixture of objectives that often change over time with economic and financial circumstances.
For example, a stabilization fund may grow in size and becomes more like a savings fund. For all these reasons, it is perilous to try to classify SWFs by objectives. Table 1 provides a list of 60 SWFs, including four pension reserve funds, of 44 countries; the year when each fund was first established; the principal sources of its financial resources; the size of its assets under management, or an estimate of its size, based on the most recent information available; and the amount of its foreign assets or an estimate thereof. The table provides, in the lower portion, information on nine government pension funds, including funds from an additional four countries.
The total assets of the entities listed in table 1 are $5.9 trillion, $3.3 trillion in SWF assets and $2.6 trillion in assets of government pension funds.
3 Asian funds account for 36 percent of SWFs assets listed in table 1 and 61 percent of the assets of the sample of government pension funds, which is dominated by Japan's Government Pension Investment Fund.
Of the 60 SWFs listed in table 1, 14 have estimated assets of at least $48 billion. Those funds account for 87 percent of total SWF assets. The eight SWFs with assets of $100 billion or more account for 75 percent of the total. Thus, the bulk of SWF assets are concentrated in a small number of funds and countries, which raises issues of their economic and financial power and influence. The 13 Asian SWFs listed in the table account for 36 percent of all SWF assets. Four of the funds have total assets of more than $100 billion. Asian countries are big players in the SWF universe both as a group and individually.
As a group, the SWFs listed in table 1 hold an estimated 86 percent of their portfolios in foreign assets. For the nine government pension funds, the share of foreign assets is substantially lower on average:
33 percent. The share of foreign assets also is lower at 69 percent for the 13 Asian SWFs, in part reflecting the different origins of some of these funds. For example, Singapore's Temasek Holdings, the China Investment Corporation (CIC), and Australia's Future Fund were initially endowed with domestic assets, either primarily or exclusively. Although the CIC receives an inordinate amount of attention today; based on the latest available information, less than 25 percent of its balance sheet is in foreign assets. foreign exchange reserves to fund their SWFs in whole or in part, including some of the largest funds.
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Sometimes the foreign exchange reserves used to fund an SWF continue to be included as part of the country's international reserves, and vice versa. However, about 20 percent of all countries with SWFs, fund them from sources other than directly from earnings from the export of natural resources or from foreign exchange reserves. Government pension fund are funded from either fiscal revenues or the contributions of employers and employees.
It is striking that all four SWFs that are funded from foreign exchange reserves are Asian, and only three of the Asian SWFs are funded from proceeds from the export of natural resources. More than half of the Asian SWFs receive their funding from other sources, primarily fiscal resources.
In partial summary of this background information on SWFs as it relates to the question of whether Asian SWFs are different, the following points are relevant: Asian SWFs are prominent in the SWF universe, and Asia is home to a disproportionate share of the largest funds. A somewhat lower share of Asian SWF assets are invested outside their home countries than for non-Asian funds. The number of Asian SWFs has increased as rapidly as the overall universe of funds. Since the global economic and financial crisis, assets under management of Asian funds have increased somewhat faster than the global total. The most striking feature differentiating Asian SWFs from those of other regions is the concentration of their funding on foreign exchange reserves and on sources other than the proceeds from 5 exports of natural resources. This feature is relevant because of the criticisms elsewhere of some of the policies that have led to large accumulations of foreign exchange reserves by some Asian countries.
Governments have established sovereign wealth funds in many different forms to achieve a range of objectives. In their international investment activities, SWFs are a manifestation of increased financial globalization as well as of shifts in economic and financial power relationships in the world economy.
In my view, SWFs are not the most important aspect of the latter trend, but the issues and concerns that SWFs raise are important in their own right and indicative of more general concerns about the role of governments in international economic and financial matters. A government's decisions about its international investments by any of its SWF affect four categories of interests: the government's specific interests, and those of its citizens, of financial market participants at home and abroad, and of governments and citizens in other countries.
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In my research on SWFs (Truman 2007 (Truman , 2008a (Truman , and 2010 , I have identified, among many candidates, five broad areas of concern: (1) mismanagement of investments by SWFs to the economic and financial detriment of the citizens of the home country of the fund, who bear most of the economic and financial consequences of any mismanagement; (2) pursuit of national political or economic power objectives via SWFs; (3) exacerbation of financial protectionism inspired by actual or perceived threats from foreign SWFs; (4) the potential for financial market turmoil and uncertainty associated with SWF activities; and (5) conflicts of interest between countries with SWFs and countries in which they investbetween home and host governments, between host governments and the funds, and between the funds and the general public in countries in which they invest.
The first two concerns primarily involve the policies and behavior of the countries that are home to SWFs. It can be argued that these concerns are shared by all government-sponsored investment institutions, and it is important to appreciate the fact that SWFs are only one form of cross-border investments by governmental entities, or global public investors in the terminology of West et al (2011) .
In today's world, the management of some countries' reserves is little different from the management of SWF investments, and there are many other government-owned entities that invest abroad. However, for many countries with SWFs, their funds tend to the principal vehicle for foreign investment. For many host countries, SWFs are perceived to be more consequential and potentially threatening than other forms, because of their size. The second two concerns primarily involve the attitudes, policies, and markets of the host country to SWF investments. The last concern involves relationships between both groups of countries.
Some argue that all these concerns are largely hypothetical-in particular concerns (2) and (4) with combined assets of more than $300 billion: Japan, Singapore, China, and Hong Kong.
The mismanagement of SWF assets is primarily a concern with respect to countries at a lower level of development such as Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam because these economies have proportionately more to lose as a result of corruption and asset mismanagement. With respect to countries using their SWFs to pursue political and economic power objectives, it should be recognized that there is a heavy dose of politics involved in SWFs and their investments, at least at the level of perception. This type of concern, for better or worse, is most often associated with larger countries, in particular countries that less than fully embrace the international norms and conventions of the mature industrial countries, such as China and to some extent Japan. In summary, the fact that Asian SWFs are disproportionately funded out of foreign exchange reserves and sources other than the proceeds of exports of natural resources, and the fact that the policies that led to some of the accumulations of foreign exchange reserves (by China, Japan, Singapore, and potentially Korea) have been internationally criticized, suggests that the activities of some Asian funds will receive closer scrutiny than the SWFs of other countries.
PolIcy reSPonSeS
The emergence The SWF scoreboard provides one metric for assessing the Santiago Principles and the work of the IWG of SWFs and IFSWF. The current version of the SWF scoreboard assesses the accountability and transparency of 44 SWFs and nine government pension funds from 37 countries. 7 It consists of 33 elements based on systematic, regularly available, public information. 8 Each element in the scoreboard asks simple questions that can be answered either yes or no. A "yes" receives a point, but we allow for partial credit. A "no" receives no credit. At least one SWF must receive a positive score on each element for that element to be included; normally several do.
The elements of the SWF scoreboard are grouped in four categories: (1) structure of the fund, including its objectives, links to the government's fiscal policy, and whether the fund is independent from the countries' international reserves; (2) governance of the fund, including the roles of the government, of the board of the fund and of its managers, and whether the fund follows guidelines for corporate responsibility; (3) accountability and transparency of the fund in its investment strategy, investment activities, reporting, and audits; and (4) behavior of the fund in managing its portfolio and its risk management policies, including the use of leverage and derivatives.
For its part, the Santiago Principles include 30 principles and subprinciples that overlap with 25 of the 33 elements in the SWF scoreboard. This permits not only a comparison between the two standards as they are applied to SWFs, but also a basis for assessing the comprehensiveness of the Santiago Principles.
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SWFs would score 76 out of 100 on the SWF scoreboard if they only complied completely with the Santiago Principles that overlap with the scoreboard, which of course is not generally the case; some SWFs comply with more and some with less. From the perspective of the SWF scoreboard, the most prominent omissions from the Santiago Principles are the failure to recommend that funds disclose their overall size (which most funds do with prominent exceptions, including Singapore's GIC), they be separated from countries' international reserves, they publish audits of their operations, and they report the currency composition of their investments. In addition, the Santiago Principles lack complete clarity on what should be, or need not be, publicly disclosed. The applicable standard should be to comply (via public disclosure) or to explain why a fund is not doing so. In other words, the Santiago Principles can be improved upon. Second, the correlation between size of a fund and its scores is positive though not significant, contrary to the often-heard assertion that larger funds are more opaque. Among the 13 funds with total assets in table 1 of more than $48 billion that we scored, the average is 54 right on that for all SWFs.
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The average score for these largest SWFs on the Santiago Principles is 59, essentially the same as that for all SWFs.
Third, looking more closely at the two standards for transparency and accountability, the scores on the Santiago Principles are slightly higher on average (by 4 percentage points) but the difference is not significant. There are, however, substantial differences for some funds. The larger differences include those for the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, Australia's Future Fund, São Tomé and Príncipe's National Oil Account, Singapore's Temasek Holdings, and Kiribati's Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund; for each fund, the difference is at least 9 percentage points. It may not be entirely a coincidence that three of these SWFs are in Asia. Singapore and Australia, in particular, were active members of the group that drew up the Santiago Principles. Thus, they were able to influence the content of the standard and, presumably, now feel greater pressure to bring their funds closer in line with it.
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Fourth, on both standards, the government pension funds score on average higher that the regular SWFs, almost all above 80. This pattern is not particularly surprising given that government pension funds, as well as SWFs set up as pension reserve funds, generally operate under tighter laws, regulations, and rules than one might expect would apply generally to the more broader universe of SWFs. However, an interesting point is that the government pension funds as a group and individually do not score uniformly higher than all of the SWFs.
Fifth, other comparisons reveal differences in average performance that are significant with respect to the SWF scoreboard (Truman 2010, On the basis of this analysis, I conclude that the Santiago Principles are a very good first step toward improving the accountability and transparency of SWFs, albeit not as comprehensive and robust as they could be. SWFs that participate in the IFSWF score higher on the SWF scoreboard as well as on my application of the Santiago Principles, but there is substantial room for improvement for almost all funds on either standard. Although the Asian SWFs score higher on average than those of other regions of the world on both standards, and the scores of Asian funds on the SWF scoreboard have increased, in some cases dramatically, there remains substantial room for improvement on the part of almost all Asian as well as non-Asian funds. The IFSWF in mid-July will release a report on a survey of the experiences of its members with the application of the Santiago Principles. This will be a major test for the IFSWF. How comprehensive will the report be? How frank will the report be about the fact, documented in this paper, that on the SWF scoreboard and on my assessment of the Santiago Principles, several of the SWFs that are members of the IFSWF have low scores, starting with the Libyan Investment Authority, which it is impossible to score, but including the Qatar Investment Authority, and the Russian SWFs.
Moreover, with respect to the Santiago Principles and the IFSWF, it is not enough that those funds linked to the IFSWF improve their scores; it is in the interest of those funds and to the IFSWF that the scores of all funds improve. Among other reasons, public attitudes in countries that are host to SWF investments are affected by the behavior of all funds, regardless of whether they are members of the IFSWF. In that connection, it is regrettable that the official membership in the IFSWF has been static since the IWG was first organized three years ago. Among the 20 SWFs listed in SWFs. This effort was motivated, in part, by increased anxiety about investments from countries that had not participated in drawing up the OECD framework in particular as it applied to investments by governmental entities, including SWFs. For the mature industrial countries, the shoe of openness to foreign investments was now on the other foot, and it was being worn by entities controlled by governments. Of course, the concerns about governmental investments were not directed solely at SWFs.
The bulk of SWF investments do not involve control, but some SWF investments are controlling. On the other hand, helping to contribute to a more balanced view, at least a dozen countries that are members of the OECD have their own SWFs, or the equivalent in the form of government pension funds. Seven OECD countries participated in the IWG that drew up the Santiago Principles. Thus, the congruence between concerns about SWFs investments and other governmental cross-border investments and the sources of those investments is not perfect. A number of major host countries to SWF investments have a reciprocal stake in the fairness of applicable investment regimes to SWFs.
The OECD review resulted in no change in the framework applied to cross-border investments.
That modest result in itself was significant and not foreordained when the OECD review started. In June 2008, the OECD Ministerial Council adopted a declaration on SWFs that reaffirmed the applicability of the existing OECD framework to investments by such entities, implicitly rejecting a separate regime for them. In a companion step, in October 2008 the Investment Committee of the OECD issued a set of Guidelines for Recipient Country Investment Policies Relating to National Security. The legal status of those guidelines was raised in May 2009 by the OECD Council. The guidelines recognized that national security considerations could be used as an excuse to block foreign investments, including by SWFs. At the same time, they sought to establish broad principles to minimize discrimination, increase transparency and predictability, limit restrictions as narrowly as possible, and make countries accountable for their policies.
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How should one judge the OECD efforts? In my view, the good news is that there was no formal blessing of a tightening of investment regimes in response to perceived threats from SWFs. The bad news is that an opportunity was missed to expand the openness of the OECD regime in particular as it applies to SWFs.
A number of initiatives would have been desirable in 2008-09. They are still desirable. First, the nondiscrimination provisions of OECD investment codes and standards are binding, in the loosest sense of that word because they are enforced only via peer reviews, only on members of the OECD alone.
Demarolle (2008) uses the word "mandatory" to describe the OECD regime and contrasts that with the voluntary nature of the then-proposed best practices for SWFs. However, the comparison is not particularly apt because the OECD framework of nondiscrimination extends to nonmembers, as long as they are also members of the IMF, only on a best-endeavors basis. It would have been desirable to explore the possibility of broadening this nondiscrimination to the SWFs of nonmember countries, perhaps with an implicit quid pro quo in terms of the best practices for such funds that were then being worked out in the IWG of SWFs and ultimately became the Santiago Principles. This would have enhanced the stability and predictability of investment regimes in OECD countries.
Second, under the circumstances, including the crisis that was then breaking over the global economy and financial system, it is unfortunate that the OECD countries did not call for a meaningful standstill on new restrictive measures governing investment, instead of merely referencing a commitment to a standstill that had been observed in the breach for some time.
Third, individual OECD countries have invoked multiple exceptions to the investment principles and guidelines even as they apply to OECD members. In other words, what is weakly binding has many loopholes. It is unfortunate in this context that no effort apparently was made to limit those exceptions or, at a minimum, shine more light on them. The peer review processes at the OECD take the status quo, which includes exceptions, as the baseline and examine members' policy actions against that baseline of national treatment. This is not a zero baseline. It does not contribute to a predictable investment framework.
Fourth, the new guidelines on foreign investment and national security concerns were a step forward in that they at least codified the issues. However, the obstacles to the creation of a level playing field are many. National security is a huge loophole in national investment policies through which garden variety of financial and other forms of protectionism can expand.
Consider some of the sectors that are exempted on national security grounds. In the United
States, restrictions on foreign investment are justified on "essential security" grounds in three sectors:
air and maritime transport; radio, broadcasting, and telephone; and (my favorite) maritime dredging 14 and salvaging. In the United Kingdom, there is a broad exclusion for controlling investments that are "contrary to the interests of the United Kingdom or a substantial part of it."
In general, the investment policies of many OECD members are inconsistent with the Investment Committee's call for regulatory proportionality: "Restrictions on investment, or conditions on transaction,
should not be greater than the need to protect national security and they should be avoided when other existing measures are adequate and appropriate to address a national security concern" (Gordon 2010, 118) . National security morphs into essential security. Essential security for some countries becomes in other countries public security (France), public order (France, Germany, and Japan), public safety (Germany and Japan), net benefits from foreign investment (Canada), gross benefits (New Zealand), or the national interest (Australia).
These are broad issues and they involve many types of cross-border investment, but in the context of reciprocal responsibility between home and host countries for SWF investments, several points stand out.
Declared national and economic security interests are essentially unchallengeable under international law.
However, that fact does not prevent the OECD from covering them under its peer review processes, and those processes could be opened up routinely to nonmember countries with SWFs of significant size. What about Asian SWFs? Is Asia different? Asia is a major player in the SWF universe. Because of the size of some Asian SWFs and differences in the source of funding of many Asian funds, they create more anxiety in potential host countries. As a result, those Asian funds will be held to a higher standard of accountability and transparency. Thus, it is in Asia's interest to promote increased compliance with SWF standards in Asia and elsewhere. It is also in Asia's interest to press not only for greater openness to SWF and other cross-border investments but also to lead by example. Created by the general government for macroeconomic purposes, SWFs hold, manage, or administer assets to achieve financial objectives, and employ a set of investment strategies that include investing in foreign financial assets." The IWG noted that "general government includes both central government and subnational government." It added, "SWFs are commonly established out of balance of payments surpluses, official foreign currency operations, the proceeds of privatizations, fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts resulting from commodity exports." This language on the financial resources used to establish and expand SWFs is also found in the IMF's Sixth Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual (IMF 2009a 4. Of course, the funding of SWFs from exports of natural resources requires the accumulation of foreign exchange, but none of the countries listed as funding their SWFs from foreign exchange reserves has a dominant export commodity.
5. See Truman (2007) . Gelpern (2011) expands on this matrix by considering four axes of SWF accountability and associated demands on SWFs which stand in uneasy relation to each other: public internal (citizens and the general public), private internal (specific groups of beneficiaries and constituencies within the country), public external (obligations based on explicit or implicit international norms or standards), and private external (obligations grounded in laws and regulations). 11. The one SWF with estimated assets of more than $48 billion that we did not score, because of a lack of information, is the Libyan Investment Authority. Including that fund would lower the average score for these largest funds.
12. The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority is in the same position.
13. In the OECD versus non-OECD comparison Chile, Korea, and Mexico are included in the OECD. The SWFs of those countries are included with the non-OECD countries in the other comparisons.
14. The changes for both Asian SWFs and Asian government pension funds are similar using the Santiago Principles as the standard.
15. The other vice chair is Bader Mohammad Al-Sa'ad, Managing Director of the Kuwait Investment Authority.
16. As few of the elements in the scoreboard changed between the 2007 edition (SWE scoreboard 1.0) and the 2010/2011 edition (SWF scoreboard 3.0); see Truman 2010. However, those small changes do not alter the broad thrust of the results presented in table 4 although they do account for the small decline in the score for Timor-Leste's SWF . As with table 2,  table 4 incorporates the updated score for ADIA based on its 2010 annual report issued in March 2010 and reported in Truman (2010) .
17. The other SWFs are those of Algeria and Kazakhstan and two funds in the UAE, which is a country that participated in the IFSWF. It has been reported that representatives of Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, and Papua New Guinea participated in the May 2010 meeting of the IFSWF and that Malaysia has become a new member, but no formal announcement has been about Malaysia's status.
18. The discussion in this and the following paragraphs draws upon Truman (2010, chapter 7).
19. See Gordon 2010 as well as Truman 2010 for details.
20. The OECD, as described in Gordon 2010, has made some laudable efforts to expand the peer review process and institute roundtables that involve nonmembers well as members. 1 
